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I am Ireland / and I'm silenced.
I cannot tellmyabortions /mydivorces /myyears of slavery /
My fights for freedom.
It's got to the stage where I can hardly remember what I
had to tell /
And when I do / I speak in whispers (Medbh, 1993).
Máighréad Medbh's powerful poem, Easter 1991, encap-
sulates the struggles over the relationship between gender,
national identity and Ireland. Medbh's cry – for recognition,
for conversation, for openness – is framed in the context of a
discursive construction of Ireland that is gendered and
exclusionary. This gendered and exclusionary construction
of Ireland and Irish identity has been commented on and
written about by a range of feminist scholars. Their concerns
have included the Irish Constitution, employment rights,
reproductive rights, sexuality and mobility, with a particular
focus on the restrictions and limitations placed on womenNational University o
All rights reserved.f(see, for example, Connolly, 2003; Connolly & O'Toole, 2005;
Cullen-Owens, 2005; Hayes & Urquhart, 2004; O'Connor,
1998; Ryan & Ward, 2004; Smyth, 1988; Valiulis & O'Dowd,
1997; Ward, 1991). In this way, discussions about the
relationship between gender, national identity and Ireland
have paralleled broader international debates around these
relationships (see, for example, Anthias and Yuval-Davis,
1989; McClintock, Mufti, & Shohat, 1997; Yuval-Davis, 1997).
More recently, feminist scholars have pointed out the ongoing
gendered construction of Irish identity in the face of changing
patterns of migration. This work has particularly focused
on asylum seekers (see, for example, Lentin, 2003, 2005;
Luibhéid, 2004, 2006), with a growing emphasis on pregnant
women and on race (see, for example, Fletcher, 2005; Garner,
2005, 2007). Many of these debates crystallise around the
2004 Citizenship Referendum, which fundamentally changed
the basis on which Irish citizenship is granted.
Our article builds on this extensive body of work to argue
that recent transformations in the construction of Irish
citizenship are best understood as an outcome of complex
socio-spatial processes that rely on legally articulated under-
standings of the relationship between people and place
that are both particular and restrictive. We argue that a
variety of interconnected spaces, sites and practices are
crucial to understanding the ways in which citizenship laws
are enacted, enforced and challenged. Our efforts to outline
and interrogate these understandings – drawing on critical
geographies of the law, scale and mobility – also highlight the
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may be challenged. In short, while our article builds on the
case study of Ireland, our analysis has relevance for a variety
of instances where law and legal discourse is used as a
means to link identity to space and to create geographies of
belonging and exclusion.
Our article thus has twoparts. Thefirst discusses Ireland and
citizenship, and analyses theways inwhich the legal discourses
that are central to the construction of Irish citizenship rely on
seemingly static but fundamentallymutable conceptualisations
of the space-identity nexus, particularly in relation to the State,
the Family andWomen. The second draws on the Irish example
tomakebroader claims about critical geographies of citizenship
that have resonance at a range of different scales and in a range
of different contexts.
Ireland and citizenship
In the last four years, significant changes have been made
to Ireland's laws about citizenship, asylum and immigration.
On January 23rd 2003 the Irish Supreme Court ruled that the
‘non-national' parents of Irish citizens did not enjoy the right
of residency in Ireland.1 After this landmark ruling the
constitutional guarantees for citizenship as a right of all
children born on the island of Ireland were removed
following a referendum passed (with 79% of the vote) on
11th June 2004 (Brennoch, 2004, p. 1). Some (for example
Lentin, 2003) have understood these changes as the state's
response to claims about ‘abusive’ asylum claims. Thus the
law can be seen as a ‘technology of control’ of the state.
Equally these changes can be seen as the erasure of particular
social and civil rights of certain groups (asylum seekers, ‘non-
nationals’, particular children born in Ireland). Without
wanting to dismiss either of these claims, we contend that a
full understanding of these changes is dependent on an
appreciation of the spaces and identities around which legal
and political arguments and claims are organized. We focus
on two such intersections: that of the Family and the State;
and that of the State and ‘Women’.
Family matters: redefining the ‘Family’ to serve the State
The Family has a privileged position within the Irish State.
Article 41 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (henceforth referred to as
the Irish Constitution or the Constitution), enacted in 1937,
recognised the importance of the family to Irish life. According
to Article 41, the ‘Family’ was recognized as the natural and
primary fundamental unit group or Irish society and as amoral
institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptable rights
antecedent and superior to all positive law. When, over a
decade ago, the Fajujonu family was facing deportation from
Ireland, they and their legal team turned to Article 41 when
making a case to remain legally in the country.2 The Fajujonu
family – a Nigerian father, a Moroccan mother and their
children - had been living illegally in Ireland since 1981. The
three childrenwere all Irish citizens on the basis of their birth.
The Fajujonus argued that their eldest child, drawing on her
rights under Article 41, was entitled to remain in Ireland with
her family and therefore her parents could legally stay in
Ireland. The case concluded in the Supreme Court in 1990
with a judgment from Mr Justice Finlay that children have aconstitutional right to the company, care and parentage of
their parents within a family unit (NCCRI, 2004, p.10).
In the Fajujonu ruling, the courts interpreted the law in a
way that prioritized the family unit. The rulings saw the
family's integrity as worthy of protection and the directive to
break up the family (through effective deportation) needed to
be justified by the Minister for Justice as being in the interests
of the common good and the protection of the State (in NCCRI,
2004, p.10). After the Fajujonu ruling, it became the practice of
officials from the Department of Justice to allow residency to
parents and families of Irish citizens (this changed with the
serving of deportation orders to two families in 2002).
The Fajujonu ruling was issued and implemented in a
period when rates of migration to Ireland were low. From the
mid 1990s onwards, however, rates of migration to Ireland
began to increase significantly. This was most obvious in the
case of applications for asylum in Ireland: these rose from 39
in 1992 to a peak of 11,634 in 2002 (Crowley, Gilmartin, &
Kitchin, 2008). In this changing context, public disquiet was
regularly expressed over a perceived abuse of the Irish asylum
process. In broad terms, it was speculated that many pregnant
women were claiming asylum in Ireland, giving birth to their
children in Ireland and then applying for citizenship on that
basis.3 In this changing climate, the Government became
increasingly reluctant to grant leave to remain to the parents
of Irish born children. In 2001 the Minster for Justice, Equality
and Law Reform refused leave to remain to two families with
Irish-born children. The decision was appealed and upheld in
the High Court, and was eventually heard before the Supreme
Court. In a landmark ruling on January 23rd 2003 the Irish
Supreme Court ruled, by five votes to two, to reject an appeal
against deportation orders served against a Czech Roma
couple and Nigerian couple (henceforth known as the L and O
families) who had sought asylum in Ireland, been refused, and
had argued that because their children were born in the
Republic of Ireland, they were citizens who were constitu-
tionally entitiled to a family life, it followed therefore that all
family members were entitled to residency status in Ireland.
The Supreme Court ruling was not unanimous. Five
Justices (Keane, Denham, Murray, Hardiman and Geoghegan)
rejected the appeal and two (Fennelly andMcGuinness) found
in favour. The Court's overall rejection of the L and O families'
arguments contained significant disagreements over legal
principles and interpretations of Fajujonu. In particular, the
dissenting rulings rested on different interpretations of the
relationship between the Family and the State. These
differences are important, because they highlight the ways
in which legal discourses attempt to fix the relationship
between space and identity, while at the same time high-
lighting the ways in which that relationship is discursively
altered in response to political and social concerns.
Legal discourses and contested relationships
The five Justices (Hardiman, Keane, Denham, Murray and
Geoghegan) who upheld the High Court ruling and deporta-
tion orders on the L and O families concentrated on the
limitations to the rights given to the family in the Constitu-
tion. Justice Hardiman, citing Barrington in the High Court in
the original Fajujonu ruling, argued that the Constitution does
not contemplate the family as existing in isolation but regards
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has a role to play as the guardian of the common good (Lobe,
2003, Para. 372). Justice Denham rejected the L and O families'
appeal because of the need to prioritise the sovereign rights of
the state to control its borders and the mobility of non-
nationals crossing its borders. Justice Keane also focused on
the incapability of a child to enjoy his or her social and civil
rights. If, Keane argued, a child is incapable of enjoying these
rights (in comparison to a rational free adult) then these
rights cannot be thought of as absolute.4 For these (majority)
rulings a key point about the Fajujonu ruling was not that it
established a legal principle but that the particular circum-
stances of the case were central to any understanding of the
ruling made by the Supreme Court in 1990. All of the majority
rulings included arguments that the specific details (or, to
borrow Keane's term, the 'factual matrix') were key to the
Fajujonu judgement. The empirical aspects of the Fajujonu
case (i.e. where they came from and moved to, how long they
had been in Ireland, howmany childrenwere born in Ireland)
were central to the Court's ruling. In addition all of the
majority rulings cited Barrington in the original Fajujonu High
Court ruling.
The child clearly has a certain right to be in Ireland. She
also has the right to the society of her parents. But it does
not follow from this that she has a right to the society of
her parents in Ireland (Fajujonu, 1987).
In contrast, dissenting judgments from JusticesMcGuinness
and Fennelly suggested that the appeals be allowed and the
deportation orders overturned. These judgments agreed with
the appellants' arguments that under Irish law the family is the
foundational unit of social order and therefore has constitu-
tional rights superior to the laws of the state. Justice Fennelly
reasoned that Article 41.1 of Constitution clearly outlined the
philosophical basis of role of family in Irish society i.e. that the
rightness of the family exists, family life is a part of ‘natural
justice’ and hence all the Constitution does is confirm the
existence of and protect these rights. It follows that the rights of
family are superior to those of the State. He argued that the
language of Article 41 and a series of previous rulings by the
Supreme Court (on different issues including disputes over
adoptions) consistently argue the primacy of the family unit in
these cases (Lobe, 2003, Para. 516). For JusticeMcGuinnesswhat
was important about Fajujonu was that it was consistent with
the line of decisions on the constitutional rights of the family
which preceded it (Lobe, 2003, Para. 276). McGuinness argued
that the parents of both childrenwere exercising their rights to
choose on behalf of their child. In both cases the child's welfare
rested in the maintenance of the family unit unless there were
'compelling reasons' for this not to be so (Lobe, 2003, Para. 250).
ForMcGuinness and Fennelly, the integrity andmaintenance of
the asylum and immigration system were not compelling
reasons. These judgments prioritised the constitutional rights
of the family for Irish citizens. These rulings can be understood
as based upon representations of 'the family' as a conceptual
and legal space which enjoys particular rights that, although
theydonotover-rideother rights (mostnotably the rights of the
state to deport non-citizens), must be treated with the utmost
seriousness. The rulings that rejected the families' arguments
prioritised the integrity of the State over these constitutionalrights. These rulings were based upon representations of the
nation and the paramount importance of maintaining national
borders and sovereignty.
The place of women in the practice of citizenship
The January 2003 Supreme Court rulings were built upon a
series of arguments and claims about specific public (the
State) and private (the Family) spaces. The resulting config-
uration resulted in the exclusion and expulsion of specific
kinds of families from Ireland. In the rest of this article we go
on to consider the subsequent Citizenship Referendum in
June 2004. We argue that the debates surrounding this
constitutional referendum derive their meaning in part from
ongoing struggles in Ireland over state control over women's
reproductive, sexual and mobility rights. This, we argue, is
crucial to how the Irish state puts citizenship into practice.
‘Citizenship tourism’ and the Citizenship Referendum, June 2004
After the Supreme Court rulings, attention turned to
Ireland's citizenship laws, the very ‘natural’ rights enjoyed
by the Fajujonu, L and O children. The 2004 Citizenship
Referendumwas announced inMarch 2004 andpassed in June
2004, with 79% of voters favouring its introduction. The
resulting amendment to the Constitution changed the basis
for Irish citizenship from birth to blood, and ensured that
citizenship would be in the future defined legislatively rather
than constitutionally. It read:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution,
a person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its
islands and seas, who does not have, at the time of the
birth of that person, at least one parent who is an Irish
citizen or entitled to be an Irish citizen is not entitled to
Irish citizenship or nationality, unless provided for by law
(Referendum Commission, 2004).
In this way, the Citizenship Referendum explicitly related
Irish citizenship to ancestry and bloodline. This is in contrast
to the earlier Supreme Court rulings which, with the
exception of Justice Keane, did not discuss the ethnicity of
the L and O families.5 The ethnicity of the L and O families –
Nigerian and Roma – is not insignificant. These groups were
numerically greatest in the asylum system, and theywere also
constructed as problematic within racialised discussions
about Irishness in the late 1990s (see Lentin and McVeigh,
2002). Thuswhile the ethnicity of the L andO (and, earlier, the
Fajujonu) families were not explicitly made part of the
Supreme Court rulings, they structured the political
responses, developments and debates in the aftermath of
the rulings in such away as to rule out particular familes from
being part of the national family. For some commentators, the
results of the referendum represented the negation of the
possibility of an Irish multiculturalism, planned and executed
by a political elite in Ireland who were themselves conform-
ing to a ‘Fortress Europe’ (for example see Garner, 2005;
Lentin, 2005). As persuasive as this argument is, we suggest
that it fails to adequately explore why an abstract notion like
citizenship gained such political ‘traction’ so quickly. We
maintain that the Citizenship Referendum and the discourses
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20 years of feminist struggles over reproductive and mobility
rights in Ireland. The existence of a reservoir of contradictory
claims, anxieties and ambiguities surrounding the politics of
abortion rights, mobility rights and the pregnant body
in Ireland helped create the conditions for various claims
about the Citizenship Referendum to make sense to the Irish
electorate.
Problem pregnancies and the threat of mobility
The reasons given for such a fundamental change to the
concept of citizenship in Ireland were, on the surface,
straightforward. According to politicians, the 19th amendment
to the Constitution, introduced in 1998 and guaranteeing Irish
citizenship to anyone born on the island of Ireland, had resulted
in an unintended consequence. This ‘loophole’ had facilitated
the development of so-called “citizenship tourism”: women
coming to Ireland solely for the purposes of giving birth to a
child who would then be entitled to Irish citizenship. In this
way, particular groups of pregnant women were charged with
exploiting Ireland's constitutional guarantees for citizenship;
and mobile pregnant women in particular were constructed as
a threat to the state. Garner (2005), Luibhéid (2004) and Lentin
(2004, 2005), among others, have shown the momentum and
power of this discursive construction of problem women and
problem pregnancies. As Lentin argues:
the debate posits ‘non-national’ women as intentionally
mothering the next generation of Irish citizens, illustrat-
ing not only the moral panic about ‘floods of refugees’ but
also the insidious positioning of sexually active Irish and
‘non-national’ women alike as a danger to themselves, to
men, and to the ‘nation’ (Lentin, 2004, 308).
As Lentin highlights, the discursive construction of
(particular) pregnant women as incapable of caring for
themselves was a recurring theme. Ireland has a long history
of the denial of the rights of (particular) pregnant women:
encouraging their emigration (Earner-Byrne, 2004; Ryan,
2002), their incarceration (Lentin, 2004; Ferriter, 2004),
their deportation (Luibhéid, 2006), or the forced ‘adoption’
of their children (Ferriter, 2004, p.515) as in their better
interests. This continued in the run-up to the Citizenship
Referendum: Minister Michael McDowell described citizen-
ship tourist women as “putting themselves at risk (or being
put under pressure by their partners or others to take that
risk) by undertaking hazardous journeys,” (McDowell, 2004,
p. 2) while Declan Keane, Master of Holles Street (National
Maternity Hospital)6, commented in a radio interview that:
when these women are arriving late from Nigeria … and
often arriving, as I say, unwell, with no idea of when their
first menstrual period was, no idea of their dates, some of
them with complex medical disorders … Some issues we
can't [deal with] (RTÉ Radio, 2003).
The Referendumwas thus discursively constructed as in the
best interests of pregnant women as it would remove the
incentive for them to travel to Ireland to give birth. Its portrayal
as altruistic denied its reinforcement of the legal place of
women, especially pregnant women, in the Irish state. Inparticular, its attempts to impose restrictions on the travel of
pregnant women resonate with the issues raised almost
10 years before in the political tensions and battles over
women's reproductive and mobility rights - the X and C cases.
‘Abortion tourism’ and the right to travel
Abortion is not legal in Ireland, and its illegality was made
explicit in a 1983 amendment to the Constitution inwhich the
State expressly acknowledges “the right to life of the unborn
and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother,
guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by
its laws to defend and vindicate that right” (Bunreacht na
hEireann Article 40.3.3). Despite this, many Irish women
travel to Britain each year to avail themselves of legal abortion
services. Numbers are difficult to quantify for a range of
reasons, but possibly reach around 6,000 per annum (Oaks,
2002, p. 322). The 1983 amendment was intended to ensure
that abortion would not become legal in Ireland, thus ending
or silencing debate on the issue, but it has led instead to
renewed debate and constitutional activity. In total there have
been five constitutional referenda on abortion in Ireland in
the period from 1983 to 2002 (Mullally, 2005). Since 1983,
abortion has never strayed far from the political agenda in
Ireland, and the public debates that surrounded the ‘X’ case in
1992 and the ‘C’ case in 1997 highlight the ways in which the
bodies of young women have become sites of conflict over the
broader meanings of family, state and the law.
The ‘X’ case
The ‘X’ case involved a 14 year old girl who became
pregnant as a consequence of rape. She and her parents
decided to travel to England so she could have an abortion but,
before travelling, they asked the Garda Síochána (Irish police
force) if they should obtain any evidence from the foetus. The
police referred the question to the Director of Public Prosecu-
tions who in turn referred it to the Attorney General. The
Attorney General issued an injunction to prohibit the girl and
her parents from travelling to England to procure an abortion.
The High Court upheld the injunction and Justice Costello, in
that Court, stated that he was satisfied that there was a “real
and imminent danger to the life of the unborn” (A.G. v X,1992,
Para.19).While therewas a risk that the girl may take her own
life, it was “much less and of a different order of magnitude
than the certainty that the life of the unborn will be
terminated”, thus the court's duty was to protect the life of
the unborn – particularly since the “young girl has the benefit
of the love and care of support of devoted parents who will
help her through the difficult months ahead” (A.G. v X, 1992,
Para. 19). This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court in
1992. The Supreme Court overturned this decision in a
majority ruling, and Chief Justice Finlay asserted that the
proper test to be applied was whether or not there was a “real
and substantial risk to the life, as distinct from the health, of
the mother” (A.G. v X, 1992, Para. 37). Despite this conclusion,
which ultimately meant that ‘X’ was free to travel to England
for an abortion, Chief Justice Finlay also pointed out that “if
there were a stark conflict between the right of a mother of an
unborn child to travel and the right to life of the unborn child,
the right to life would necessarily have to take precedence
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concurred, arguing that the right to travel “must surely rank
lower than the right to life of the unborn” (A.G. v X,1992, Para.
185), and Justice Hederman in agreement argued that the
preservation of life was paramount to the right to travel.
Justices McCarthy and O'Flaherty expressed dissenting views
on the right to travel. Justice McCarthy argued that an
individual's right to travel could not be curtailed “because of
a particular intent” (A.G. v X, 1992, Para. 153) while Justice
O'Flaherty argued that the Court should not “interfere to this
extraordinary degree with the individual's freedom of move-
ment” (A.G. v X, 1992, Para. 166). Justice O'Flaherty further
argued that the injunction represented “an unwarranted
interference with the authority of the family” (A.G. v X, 1992,
Para. 166).
In common with the L&O case over 10 years later, the
judgements in the X case outlined differing views of the
family. For Justice O'Flaherty, family authority – at least that of
a heterosexual, nuclear family - was central and needed to be
upheld. For Chief Justice Finlay, the unborn life could not
just be seen as the responsibility of the family: in this way,
the State had authority over the family in the interests of
preserving life. In the context of this article, however, it is the
divergences in the descriptions of X that are of most interest.
Alternately described as a young girl, a girl, a mother, or a girl/
mother, her identity changes in line with the changing legal
arguments about the relationship between the state, the
family and unborn children. Take, for example, Chief Justice
Finlay's argument that the right to life would have to take
precedence, at times, over the right to travel. In this instance,
the identity of the pregnant girl is subsumed under the
category ‘mother’, and as a ‘mother’, her rights are subsumed
under those of her unborn child. In fact, it is this move from
girl to mother that fundamentally changes X's relationship
with the State. The existence of an unborn child meant that
the State could prioritise the identity of the girl as mother, and
thus minimize the rights of the girl as citizen. The existence of
an unborn child meant that the State could prioritise the
potential family over the existing family, and insist on its
rights over both.
The X case led to a political crisis in Ireland and, as a
consequence, the Irish electorate voted again on a series of
abortion-related amendments to theConstitution. InNovember
1992, the Irish electorate voted to accept the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, which guaran-
teed, respectively, the right to travel and the right to informa-
tion. The electorate rejected the Twelfth Amendment, which
drewon the SupremeCourt judgement to suggest the following
addition to the Constitution:
It shall be unlawful to terminate the life of an unborn
unless such termination is necessary to save the life, as
distinct from the health, of the mother where there is an
illness or disorder of the mother giving rise to a real and
substantial risk to her life, not being a risk of self-
destruction.
As a consequence of this vote, the Government stated that
it would revise legislation in line with the result and with the
X judgement. A Green Paper was published in 1999, but no
legislation has yet been introduced.The ‘C’ case
Despite the issues raised by the X judgement and the
subsequent referendums, the issue of abortion and travel
came to the forefront again in the ‘C’ case in 1997. As in the ‘X’
case, the ‘C’ case involved a 13 year old girl, who also was
pregnant as a result of rape, and who wanted to travel to
England for an abortion. After the rape, the girl was taken into
the care of the Eastern Health Board, who housed her with a
foster mother andwho sought permission for her to travel out
of Ireland for the purposes of terminating the pregnancy.
Initially C's parents supported her wish for an abortion, but
they later changed their minds. They appealed to the High
Court a District Court decision that their daughter be allowed
to leave Ireland. In particular, they claimed that the constitu-
tional authority of the family had not been adequately
recognised, and their rights and duties as parents of C had
not been duly considered. Justice Geoghegan, in refusing the
parents' appeal, stated that they hadno constitutional rights in
relation to their grandchild, and implied that their rights as
parents had been compromised by their behaviour. He
asserted that the District Court judge was correct to take the
view that C's parents were neglectful, and further commented
that their behaviour “did not correspond in various respects to
the kind of behaviour one would expect of parents in such
appalling circumstances” (A and B, 1997, Para. 7). Justice
Geoghegan concluded that he was not satisfied that, for C's
parents, “their daughter's welfare is the most important
consideration for them” (A and B, 1997, Para. 19). Yet the
words of C's father as quoted by Justice Geoghegan present a
different picture. Asked by the judge in the District Court if he
had listened to the evidence of the psychiatrist, C's father said:
I did and I accept quite a lot of [his] evidence….he seemed
to be a very educated man. I took a lot of it in and I know
what he is talking about. The little girl herself is talking
suicidal and I know if she says something it is more likely
that there is a danger that she will do it….She is
headstrong, but at the same time if we can avoid an
abortion, if she is counselled a bit more and given a little
bit more help let her have the baby if she can have it and if
not then go for the abortion (A and B, 1997, Para. 21).
Though the basic facts of the X and C cases are similar –
both young girls, both pregnant as a result of rape, and neither
wishing to go through pregnancy – the legal responses to the
cases were quite different. In the X case, the weight of the
State apparatus was brought to bear to prevent X from
travelling to Britain for an abortion, while 5 years later, the
State sought to facilitate C in her attempts to have an abortion.
The intervening referendums made no substantial change to
the Supreme Court judgement in the X case, which ultimately
facilitated abortion in another jurisdiction provided there was
a real risk to the life of a mother. The fundamental difference
in the two cases related to the legal representation of the
family. In the X case, judges in both the High Court and the
Supreme Court commented on the exceptional qualities of X's
family. In the C case, the judge in the High Court supported
the District Court's assessment of her parents as neglectful,
and dismissed their claims that their rights and duties as
parents were not adequately considered. The implication is
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daughter were invalid. Justice Geoghegan insisted that the
welfare of the child (C) was “the first and paramount
consideration” (A and B, 1997, Para. 17): in this manner, he
authorised the courts rather than the parents as determinants
of C's best interests.
These unstable and contradictory readings of the place of a
young pregnant girl in the space of the family within the State
take on greater significance when the X and C families are
considered in more detail. The X family was white, suburban
and middle-class (Oaks, 2002; Smyth, 1998), while C came
from a Traveller family. This was made clear in court
judgements: details of the X family were obscured, while
Justice Geoghegan in the C case commented that C:
…is a member of the travelling community and one of a
family of twelve. The evidence before the District Court is
that she lived in particularly squalid conditions which
were unlike the conditions in which most travelling
people lived (A and B, 1997, Para. 7).
Despite the apparent sensitiveness in this statement to
distinguishing “most” Travellers from this particular family, it
may also be read as distinguishing Travellers from others, and
to reaffirm the position of difference that Travellers occupy in
Irish society. Laury Oaks, in her analysis of media and other
representations of the C case, highlights their (often implicit)
articulation of “widespread Irish ‘endogenous racism’” direc-
ted against Travellers (Oaks, 2002, p.319. See also Lentin and
McVeigh, 2002; MacLaughlin, 1999). Legislative practices
directed against Travellers reflect, in many instances, this
form of racism, with ongoing attempts to settle Travellers, to
control their movement, and to criminalize their ways of life
(Crowley, 2006). The formal construction of Traveller families
is relevant in this regard. The Report of the Commission on
Itineracy in 1963 distinguished Traveller families from
“normal” families (quoted in Crowley, 2006, p.136), and
subsequent official reports commented on related topics
such as the need to reduce the size of Traveller families. In
other words, just as in the Fajujonu case, the ‘family’ is
constructed through legal discourses that construct hierar-
chies of families. Those hierarchies, in turn, regulate access to
rights within the context of the ongoing legal rescripting of
the Irish state.
The legal arguments and rulings in the X and C cases are
thus simultaneously the same as and different to Fajujonu and
the L and O cases. Like L and O and Fajujonu, the X and C cases
were built upon particular representations of the family and
its relationship to the State. In particular, the discursive
construction of a hierarchy of families helped determine the
access X and C had to their mobility rights. However unlike L
and O and Fajujonu, in the X and C cases the gendering of the
pregnant girl/woman/child played a fundamental role in the
different interpretations and rulings on X and C's social,
political and civil rights. Just as Article 41 of the Irish
constitution highlighted the special place of the Family
within the Irish state, it also insisted on the special place of
‘Woman’ within the Family. Article 41.2 asserted that “by her
life within the home, woman gives to the State a support
without which the common good cannot be achieved. The
State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shallnot be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to
the neglect of their duties in the home”. In this way, the legal
relationships between women, the family and the Irish state
were codified. Discursively produced as fundamental to the
workings and continuation of the Irish State, particular
women have thus been subject to significant controls by the
State. These controls have been varied, covering bodies (for
example, limited access to contraception), labour (for exam-
ple, the ‘marriage ban’ prevented most married women from
working in public service occupations), capital (for example,
inheritance law) and, importantly, women's mobility. For the
most part the struggles over abortion in Ireland have been
played out in attempts to regulate and control pregnant
women's mobility across Ireland's international borders.
All this is important because while the legal arguments
and debates presented in the Fanjujonu, L and O, X and C cases
may have the aura of fixity and permanence, our discussions
and arguments reveal how these are based uponmutable and
changing constructions and conceptualisations of the rela-
tionship between identity and space. Legal texts and rulings
like the Supreme Court rulings are part of a range of different
discursive representations that imagine the nation and are
always shaped in order to conform to hegemonic and
dominant ideologies (Kobayashi, 1995; Young,1997; Luibhéid,
2004). To put it another way it is mistaken to view law as
simply made up of rules, regulations and procedures. These
may be part of law, but law is also “a way in which a people
interprets a culture to itself, a way in which a society sums up
its ideals while at the same time reinforcing them…a
country's laws (like its music, art, religion, history and
science) is part of the story we are constantly inventing and
re-inventing about who we are, where we come from and
what we want to become” (Glendon, 1986: quoted in Duncan,
1988, p.75).Recognising this involves taking part in this
invention and reinvention and seeking to explore ways
which critical arguments may be employed to articulate an
alternative politics of citizenship in Ireland. In the following
section we provide some pointers to such an argument.
Critical geographies of citizenship
In our examination of the changing conceptualization of
citizenship in Ireland, we have argued that legal discourses
that attempt to define and fix citizenship do so through an
articulation of a particular understanding of the relationship
between space and identity. Certain spaces and identities are
central to the process: in Ireland, ongoing contestations over
the meanings and relationships between the State, the Family
and Woman are crucial to understanding the articulation of
citizenship. In this section of the paper, we argue that
attempts to define and fix citizenship through legal discourses
may be also challenged using insights from critical geogra-
phies. Our particular focus is on law, scale and mobility –
concepts that simultaneously work to define and challenge
citizenship.
The first point of challenge comes from critical legal
geography. This builds on ‘critical legal studies’, which
examines the ways laws and legal discourses are constitutive
of social life, experiences and relations. Over the last twenty
years a number of geographers and legal scholars have
advanced arguments and accounts that explore the mutual
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1994; Blomley, Delaney, and Ford, 2001; Clark, 1989; Cooper,
1998; Delaney, 1998, 2004; Ford, 1994; Kobayashi, 1995;
White, 2001, 2002). Law is implicated in everyday social
contexts and political struggles and these take place and are
articulated over space in concrete social and political
contexts. ). Theoretically, these critical legal geographers
have argued for a conceptual framework that represents the
world as simultaneously legal and sociospatial (Blomley
quoted in Delaney, 2004, p.859).
As a way of exploring these processes Delaney (2004) uses
the ‘nomosphere’ as a way of thinking about how spatiolegal
representations overlap with the spatiolegal material world.
For Delaney (2004) the nomosphere exists in the ever-shifting
interplay between legal signifiers and material locations as
these are mediated by sociospatial forms (Delaney, 2004,
p.851). Through looking at a series of rulings over evictions
from public housing programmes in the United States
Delaney argues that the legal arguments made by diverse
legal actors are:
ways of making sense of power and experience and
meanings and the segmented spaces and places of the
sociomaterial world. They are practical interventions and
perturbations in the nomosphere connecting chains of
signification to places and disconnecting lives from places
by discursively operating on the rights and duties that are
understood as binding us to our lifeworlds (Delaney,
2004, p. 858).
Thus the legal arguments, representations, debates and
discourses discussed in this paper are examples of such
‘interventions’ and ‘perturbations’ in the ‘nomosphere’ in
contemporary Ireland. Our particular focus is gendered
spaces: the nation, the state, the family, and the bodies of
pregnant women, a focus that is often missing or margin-
alized in critical legal geographies. Debates about the right to
family life, jus soli vs. jus sanguine, women's reproductive
rights and the right to travel and information, ‘citizenship
tourists’ and ‘abortion tourists’ all act to connect people to
particular meaning-filled places – the home, the private
sphere, maternity wards in Irish hospitals, UK abortion clinics.
Equally, they also act to disconnect people from other
meaning-filled places – deportees from family members and
local communities, mothers-to-be from maternity services,
pregnant Irish women from friends and family – in myriad
ways. Similarly, the legal debates and arguments discussed in
this article exist solely in the elite spaces of the courtroom and
legislature, academic legal texts and dry constitutional
debate. However, they are also materialized in the airlines
chartered (at taxpayers’ expense) to fly deportees back to
their countries of origin (O'Neill, 2006), in the homes and
houses hiding small children from Immigration Authorities
(Corcoran & Sheehan, 2005), in empty desks in primary and
secondary schools across Ireland (Lally & Roche, 2005), and in
the inability of unemployed or lowwage earning Irish women
or undocumented immigrants to pay for, travel to and stay in
clinics in order to have terminations in the United Kingdom
(Mullally, 2005).
Thus, the range of sites in Ireland through which the moral
geographies of citizenship (Cresswell, 2006) are played out isextensive. The concept of the nomosphere allows us to
interrogate these sites as material locations, whose relation-
ships with legal signifiers “are mediated by sociospatial forms,
especially territories” (Delaney, 2004, p.851). However, the
prioritization of territory as a sociospatial form creates its own
difficulties in relation to a critical analysis of these moral
geographies. It suggests that the ontological foundation of the
nomosphere is based on territories held in a hierarchical
relationship. Such a hierarchical relationship accords greater
significance to processes that are more spatially extensive (e.g.
globalization, citizenship) than to processes that are individua-
lized or local. In the Irish case study, such a spatial hierarchy is
evident in the prioritization of the State over individualwomen
or over specific families. In this way, legal discourses construct
scales of meaning and importance – scales that are unwittingly
reinforced through the concept of the nomosphere. Recent
scholarship within critical geography has questioned the
politics of such a scalar hierarchy, and this insight represents
the second point of challenge. Marston, Jones, and Woodward
(2005) offer an offer an account of a human geography without
scale that is based, theyargue, onaflatontology. This represents
the second point of challenge. A flat ontology is based upon/
around ‘sites’ that emerge out of specific ‘event relations’. In
other words, social sites are shaped and formed through a
‘neighbourhood’ of practices, events and orders that are folded
variously into other unfolding sites:
Neighbourhoods are not discrete, permanent and linked
‘locales’ but the localized expressions of endo-events and
exo-events, the ‘inside-of’ and ‘outside-of’ force relations
that continuously enfold the social sites they compose
(Marston et al., 2005. 426).
This offers us a useful way in which to think about how
Irish citizenship is put into practice through a variety of social
sites including UK abortion clinics; NGO, minority community
group and refugee/migrant advocacy group premises;
schools; Health Board offices; media outlets; academic
departments; and the Department of Justice, Equality and
Law Reform; and not just through legal discourses. Thinking
through the relations between these various sites ‘horizon-
tally’ might allow the possibility for progressive political
action, as Marston et al argue:
horizontality provides more entry points – conceived as
both openmulti-directionally andunfolding non-linearly –
for progressive politics, offering the possibility of enhanced
connections across sites (Marston et al., 2005, 427).
A flat ontology of scale thus challenges the assumed
spatial hierarchies that underpin legal discourses around the
relationship between space and identity. It highlights the
interconnectedness of legal decisions that attempt to enforce
state boundaries and the experiences of everyday life.
Similarly, a flat ontology of scale recognizes that restrictive
constructions of citizenship may be successfully challenged
through everyday practices, either formally or informally. In
these ways, critical geographies of scale insist on the
importance of understanding the spatial imaginaries at
work in the construction of legal discourses of citizenship,
and on the importance of understanding the ways in which
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of different, though connected, sites and spaces.
The third point of challenge relates to mobility, which is
central to many of the struggles we have outlined over
citizenship in Ireland. Legal discourses of citizenship seek
to fix the relationship between space and identity through
defining who belongs, and who is excluded from, full
participation in citizenship. Mobility – of people and of
ideas – threatens that fixity, and leads to other, and more
circumscribed, attempts to refix the relationship. We see this
at work in the context of Ireland, where mobile women and
mobile pregnantwomen are, at various times, constructed as a
threat to the integrity and sovereignty of Ireland. This process
represents State monopolization of the legitimate means of
movement (Torpey, in Cresswell, 2006, p.179). In each of the
Irish cases outlined above, institutions of the state were
intimately involved in attempting to prevent mobility or in
attempting to enforce mobility.7 Cresswell (2006), drawing on
the work of Isin, argues that othering rather than exclusion is
the fundamental process at work in the construction of
citizenship. However, this argument minimizes the ways in
which citizenship is reinforced through various practices of
exclusion – from the denial of entry into a state, to deportation
fromthe territory of a state, to the denial of permission to leave
the state.
The desire to control and restrict mobility is pervasive. We
have focused onmobility in relation to legal discourses around
citizenship, but our argument has significantly broader
import. The perceived threat posed by mobile subjects takes
on a particular resonance in the context of migration. In the
context of Ireland, the attempts to control or regulate the
mobility of particular groups of citizens, particularly women,
have been transposed onto other groups, specificallymigrants.
Pregnant mobile Irish women have been joined by other
pregnant mobile women in the articulation of threats to the
State and the justification of processes of exclusion. Migrant
women and men have been variously constructed as involved
in illegally mobile activities. These include activities that take
place across international borders, such as people trafficking
or drug smuggling, as well as activities that take place inside
national borders, such as traffic offences. Just as mobile bodies
are constructed as threats, there is a slippery quality to the
articulation of embodied threats. As patterns of migration to
Ireland change, different groups become the object of fear:
from asylum seekers and ‘Nigerians’, to economic migrants
and ‘Romanians’.
However, just as we have highlighted the ways in which
lawand scalemaybe used formore progressive analyses of the
construction and maintenance of citizenship, we want to
argue that mobility has similarly progressive possibilities. On
one level, Irish women continue to travel outside the country
to avail themselves of abortion services elsewhere, most
usually England and Wales. Their right to do so is constitu-
tionally guaranteed. The Irish Family Planning Association
estimates that each year, over 6,000women from Ireland have
abortions in Britain, and calculate that over 7% of abortions in
England and Wales each year are performed on women with
addresses in Ireland (IFPA, 2006). As Justice McCarthy pointed
out in his judgement in the X case in 1992, “since the
enactment of the Amendment, many thousands of Irish
women have chosen to travel to England to have abortions”(A.G. v X, 1992, Para. 154). This suggests the agency of
individual women when faced with attempted restrictions
on their behaviour and their mobility, though this comes at a
financial and emotional cost. On another level, the discursive
construction ofmobility as a right – in legal judgements and in
constitutional amendments – has given particular women a
means to challenge and expand their rights as citizens or as
potential citizens. Onyet another level, despite recent changes
to citizenship and to immigration law, migrants continue to
travel to Ireland, in search of refuge, work and/or adventure.
Their mobility and their presence in the country continues to
pose challenges to attempts to fix the relationship between
identity and space through legal discourse. In particular, their
presence forces us to move citizenship beyond legal discourse
and into everyday practices in everyday sites and spaces. It is
in these everyday sites and spaces – the classroom, the
shopping centre, the hospital and the home – that the
meaning of citizenship and belonging is being contested on
a daily basis. A progressive politics of citizenship is not,
however, an inevitable consequenceofmobility. Rather, as Tim
Cresswell has so convincingly shown, mobility through
increased levels of migration often leads to a reactionary
politics of citizenship, as was the case in the US in the early
twentieth century (Cresswell, 2006). Instead, the important
lesson from this article is that the tools of critical geography –
in particular, a heightened sensitivity to the spaces of legal
discourse, scale andmobility – allow us to identify theways in
which stateswork to fix citizenship through the articulation of
specific understandings of the relationship between space and
identity, and allow us to challenge those efforts.
Just as citizenship is put into practice through the articula-
tion and enforcement of exclusion, it is imagined through its
opposite, non-citizenship.Whatwehave shown in this article is
that the creation of hierarchies of citizens – women, pregnant
women, travellers, heterosexual family units, middle-class
families – creates a precedent that may then applied in
changing contexts. In Ireland, that changing context relates to
migration. As the number of asylum applications increased, the
figure of the ‘non-national’pregnantwomanwasused to signify
threats to Ireland, its sovereignty and its integrity, and used as a
justification for changing the definition of citizenship. Now, as
new migrants arrive in Ireland, their ‘non’-ness is used to
rearticulate an essentialist understanding of Irish citizenship,
with calls for tests for potential citizens (see Holland, 2007). In
this paper,we have challenged the seeming inevitability of such
attempts at fixity. We have shown how legal discourses of
citizenship rely on seemingly fixed but always changeable
articulations of the relationship between space and identity,
and that contemporary attempts at bounding and exclusion are
rooted in historical practices that create hierarchies of belong-
ing. We have also shown howmobility disrupts fixity, and how
anattention to scale focuses on connections rather than implicit
hierarchies. In this way, we argue that citizenship may be
reconceptualised as negotiated in everyday sites, spaces and
practices – the ‘nomosphere’ of critical legal geography. Legal
discourses attempt to create hierarchies of these spaces and
their relationshipwith identity, but an attention tomobility and
scale challenges these hierarchies and opens up citizenship to a
broader, more progressive articulations that, in turn, may also
change. In this way, the example of Ireland provides insights
that have broader relevance, while also challenging the silences
398 A. White, M. Gilmartin / Women's Studies International Forum 31 (2008) 390–399about the relationship between space and identity that Maigh-
read Medbh so compellingly outlines.
Endnotes
1 We recognize the difficulties with this terminology, but use it because it
has become commonplace in Irish public discourses about migration. The
discursive denial of nationality to certain immigrants in many ways
strengthens our argument about geographic distinctions.
2 Technically speaking the Department of Justice (who bear responsible for
all immigration matters in Ireland) did not attempt to deport the Fajujonu
parents. Instead they were denied permission to stay in the country and
requested to make arrangements to leave (Breen, 2003 footnote 103).
3 The Refugee Applications Commissioner commented that having Irish-
born children was the biggest reason why people withdrew from the asylum
process (often on the advice of staff from the Department of Justice) (NCCRI,
2004).
4 This logic effectively argues that the existence of human, social and civil
rights are conditional on the rights holder being capable of exercising such
rights. Not only is this based on alarming logic (as Breen, 2003 argues) it is
also based in ‘adultist’ thinking that discriminates against children.
5 In his ruling, Justice Keane referred to the “difficulty of integrating people
from very different ethnic and cultural backgrounds into the fabric of Irish
society” (Lobe, 2003, para 56).
6 Holles Street, in Dublin, is the National Maternity Hospital of Ireland. The
Master is in administrative and clinical charge of the hospital.
7 This pattern was repeated in the 2007 case of Ms D, a pregnant teenager
who expressed a wish to terminate the pregnancy on being told that her
baby had anencephaly, a fatal condition. The Health Services Executive
instructed the Passport Office not to issue Ms D with a passport, and
instructed the Irish police to arrest her if she tried to leave the country.
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